Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy in terms of interest rate or other rules has been extensively studied in recent research, for surveys see e.g. (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) , (Woodford 1999b) and (McCallum 1999) . This literature gives a central role for forecasts of future inflation and output. Empirical evidence on Germany, Japan and the US since 1979 provided by (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1998) suggests that central banks are forward looking in practice. Bank of England Inflation Reports, see (Bank of England 2002) , discuss private sector forecasts while the June and December Issues of the Monthly Bulletin of the European Central Bank, see (European Central Bank 2002) , present both internal macroeconomic projections and forecasts by other institutions. However, the precise role of these forecasts in the decision making of these central banks is not revealed. The question of whether monetary policy should be forward looking has been subject to discussion and debate. Some formulations of optimal monetary policy specify the interest rate reaction function solely in terms of fundamentals. Instrument rules such as variants of the Taylor rule are also widely considered, and discussions focus in part on whether or not the shortterm nominal interest rate should react to forecasts of inflation and/or the output gap. Theoretical studies have shown that, because the private economy is in any case forward looking, there are two potential difficulties that monetary policy design must confront.
First, the proposed interest rate rules may not perform well when the expectations of the agents are out of equilibrium, e.g. as a result of structural shifts. The consequences of temporary errors in forecasting, and the resulting correction mechanisms, have been studied in recent research using the adap- (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) show that certain standard forms of optimal interest rate setting by the Central Bank can lead to instability as economic agents unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time, with the result that the economy may not converge to the desired rational expectations equilibrium (REE). They also propose a new method of implementing optimal policy that always leads to stability under learning. (Bullard and Mitra 2002) consider the stability of equilibria when monetary policy is conducted using variants of the Taylor interest rate rule. Bullard and Mitra argue that monetary policy making should take into account the learnability constraints, which imply constraints on the parameters of policy behavior.
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Second, monetary policy rules, including some formulations for optimal setting of the instrument and some Taylor rules based on forecasts of inflation and/or output gap, can lead to indeterminacy of equilibria, as discussed further below. Under indeterminacy there are multiple, even continua of REE and the economy need not settle in the desired REE. The possible rest points can be studied using stability under learning as a selection criterion, see e.g. (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001a) and (Carlstrom and Fuerst 2001) . We note that indeterminacy is not a critical problem if the fundamental REE is the only stable equilibrium under learning. Moreover, indeterminacy need not arise if the forward-looking interest rate rule is carefully designed, see (Bullard and Mitra 2002) , (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) .
In this paper we review recent results on the performance of interest rate rules using stability under learning as the key criterion (though we also provide some discussion of determinacy of equilibria). We consider both target rules that are optimal either under commitment or discretion and also instrument rules that do not explicitly aim for optimality. The latter e  n  s  i  v  e  t  r  e  a  t  i  s  e  o  n  t  h  e  a  n  a  l  y  s  i  s  o  f  a  d  a  p  t  i  v  e  l  e  a  r  n  - After reviewing the theoretical results we take up a number of practical concerns that can arise when forecast based rules for interest rate setting are employed. The first issue is observability of relevant variables. Issues of non-observability can arise in connection with private forecasts that are needed for the desired implementation of optimal policy suggested by (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) , as well as with current data as noted in (Bullard and Mitra 2002) and (McCallum and Nelson 2000) . Second, we introduce expectation shocks and study whether they affect the conclusions derived when these shocks are absent. The third concern is knowledge of the structure of the economy that is required for implementation of optimal interest rate policies. We extend the analysis of optimal commitment policy under private agent learning to a situation in which the central bank estimates the structural parameters of the economy and uses these estimates in their rule for setting interest rates.
The Model
We use a linearized model that is standard in the literature, see (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999) for the particular formulation used here. The original nonlinear framework is based on a representative consumer, and a continuum of firms producing differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. Firms are subject to constraints on the frequency of price changes, as originally suggested by (Calvo 1983) .
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The behavior of the private sector is summarized by the two equations
which is the "IS" curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer optimization, and π
which is the price setting rule for the monopolistically competitive firms. denote private sector expectations of the output gap and inflation next period. Since our focus is on learning behavior, these expectations need not be rational (E t without * denotes rational expectations). The parameters ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1.
For brevity we do not discuss details of the derivation of equations (1) 
where
) are independent white noise. g t represents shocks to government purchases and/or potential output. u t represents any cost push shocks to marginal costs other than those entering through x t . For simplicity, we assume throughout the paper that µ and ρ are known (if not, they could be estimated).
The recent literature on monetary policy has focused on interest rate setting by the Central Bank.
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One approach examines "instrument rules" 
whereπ is the target levels of inflation and the target level of the output gap is zero. (Recall that i t is specified net of the real interest rate, which in the standard Taylor rule is usually set at 2%). More generally Taylor-type rules are of the form i
For convenience (and without loss of generality) we will take the inflation target to beπ = 0 so that this class of rules takes the form
Variations of the Taylor rule replace π 
Alternatively, interest rate policy can be derived explicitly to maximize a policy objective function. This is frequently taken to be of the quadratic loss form, i.e.
whereπ is the inflation gap. This type of optimal policy is often called "flexible inflation targeting" in the current literature, see e.g. (Svensson 1999) and (Svensson 2001) . α is the relative weight on the output target and strict inflation targeting would be the case α = 0. The policy maker is assumed to have the same discount factor β as the private sector. The literature on optimal policy distinguishes between optimal discretionary policy, in which the policy maker is unable to commit to policies for future periods, and optimal policy in which such commitment is possible. Without commitment policy is reoptimized each period and reduces to a sequence of static problems in which the Central Bank aims to minimize (π t −π) 2 + αx 2 t subject to (2). This leads to the first-order condition
Again, for convenience and without loss of generality we setπ = 0 so that the optimality condition is
Under commitment the policy maker can do better because of the effect on private expectations. Solving the problem of minimizing (6) subject to (2) holding in every period, and assuming RE, leads to a series of first order conditions for the optimal dynamic policy. This policy exhibits time inconsistency, in the sense that policy makers would have an incentive to deviate from the policy in the future, but performs better than discretionary policy. Assuming that the policy has been initiated at some point in the past, and again settingπ = 0, the first-order condition specifies
in every period.
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Neither condition (7) for optimal discretionary policy nor condition (8) for optimal policy with commitment is a complete specification of monetary policy, since one must still look for an i t rule (also called a "reaction function") that implements the policy. It turns out that a number of interest rate rules are consistent with the model (1)-(2), the optimality condition (7) or (8), and rational expectations. However, and this point is fundamental, some of the ways of implementing "optimal" monetary policy lead the economy vulnerable to either indeterminacy or instability under learning or both, while other implementations are robust to these difficulties.
The implementations of optimal policy that we will consider can be divided into "fundamentals based" and "expectations based" rules. The fundamentals based rule depends only on the observable exogenous shocks g t and u t in the case of discretionary policy, i.e.
Under policy with commitment the fundamentals based rule must also depend on x 
where the optimal coefficients are determined by the structural parameters and the policy objective function. The coefficients ψ i are chosen so that the effects of aggregate demand shocks g t are neutralized and so that for inflation shocks u t the optimal balance is struck between output and inflation effects. In (10) the dependence of i
is optimally chosen to take advantage of the effects on expectations of commitment to a rule. Calculation of the coefficients ψ i requires first calculating the optimal REE and then inserting the solution into the IS curve (1) to obtain the i t rule of the desired form. These steps are summarized in Appendix 1.
Expectations based optimal rules are advocated in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a). They argue that fundamentals based optimal rules will often be unstable under learning, as discussed below. However, if private expectations are observable then they can be incorporated into the interest rate policy rule. If this is done appropriately the REE will be stable under learning and thus optimal policy can be successfully implemented. Optimal expectations based rules take the form
under discretion or
under commitment. The specific coefficients will be derived below. The essence of these rules is that they do not assume rational expectations on the part of private agents, but are designed to feed back on private expectations in such a way that they generate convergence to the optimal REE under learning. (If expectations are rational, these rules deliver the optimal REE.) Finally, we will also examine the types of rule introduced by (McCallum and Nelson 2000) , which aim to approximate optimal policy using an interest rate rule based on x 
where θ > 0. From now on we will call this rule simply the approximate targeting rule. For reasons discussed below, they also examine a forward looking version of this rule.
Given an interest rate rule we can obtain the reduced from of the model and study its properties under rational expectations. The particular properties in which we are interested are determinacy (uniqueness) of the RE solution and the stability under learning of the REE of interest. We now turn to these issues.
Determinacy and Stability under Learning
Consider the system given by (1), (2), (3) and one of the i t policy rules (4), (5), (9), (10), (11), (12) 
for appropriate matrices M , N and P . In the case of rules (4), (9), and (11) we have N = 0 and thus the simpler system
The first issue of concern is whether under rational expectations the system possesses a unique stationary REE, in which case the model is said to be "determinate." If instead the model is "indeterminate," so that multiple stationary solutions exist, these will include undesirable "sunspot solutions", i.e. REE depending on extraneous random variables that influence the economy solely through the expectations of the agents. The possibility of interest rate rules leading to indeterminacy was demonstrated in (Bernanke and Woodford 1997), (Woodford 1999b) The second issue concerns stability under adaptive learning. If private agents follow an adaptive learning rule, such as least squares, will the RE solution of interest be stable, i.e. reached asymptotically by the learning process? If not, the REE is unlikely to be reached because the specified policy is potentially destabilizing. This is the focus of the papers by (Bullard  and Mitra 
General Methodology
Consider first the reduced form (15) under RE. It is well known that the condition for determinacy is that both eigenvalues of the 2 × 2 matrix M lie outside the unit circle. In the determinate case the unique stationary solution will be of the "minimal state variable" (or MSV) form
wherec is a 2 × 2 matrix that is easily computed. If instead one or both roots lie inside the unit circle then the model is indeterminate. There will still be a solution of the MSV form, but there will also be other stationary solutions.
Next consider the system under learning. Suppose that agents believe that the solution is of the form
but that the 2×1 vector a and the 2×2 matrix c are not known but instead are estimated by the private agents. (16) 
where either F is known or is also estimated. Inserting these expectations into (15) and solving for y t we get the implied "Actual Law of Motion" or ALM, i.e. the law that y t would follow for a fixed PLM (a, c). This is given by y
We have thus obtained an associated mapping from PLM to ALM given by ), e.g. using least squares, and the process continues. (Section 6 gives details on the form of the least squares algorithms.) The question is whether over time (a t , c t ) → (0,c). It turns out that the answer to this question is given by the E-stability principle, which advises us to look at the differential equation
where τ denotes notional time. If the REE (0,c) is locally asymptotically stable under this differential equation then the REE is stable under real time learning. Conditions for local stability of this differential equation are known as expectational stability or "E-stability" conditions. We will also refer to these stability conditions as the "conditions for stability under adaptive learning" or just the "conditions for stability under learning".
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For the reduced form (15) it can be shown that the E-stability conditions are that (i) the eigenvalues of M have real parts less than one and (ii) all products of eigenvalues of M times eigenvalues of F have real parts less than one. It follows that for this reduced form the conditions for stability under adaptive learning are implied by determinacy but not vice versa. This is not, however, a general result. For some reduced forms E-stability is a stricter requirement than determinacy and in other reduced forms neither condition implies the other.
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Consider next the reduced form (14). Standard techniques are available to determine whether the model is determinate. The procedure is to rewrite the model in first-order form and compare the number of non-predetermined variables with the number of roots of the forward looking matrix that lie inside the unit circle. In the determinate case the unique stationary solution takes the MSV form y t = a + by For E-stability we compute the mapping from the PLM to the ALM as follows. The expectations corresponding to (17) are given by
where we are treating the information set available to the agents, when forming expectations, as including v t and y
(Alternative information assumptions are straightforward to consider). This leads to the mapping from PLM to ALM given by
E-stability is again determined by the differential equation
and the E-stability conditions govern stability under least squares learning. 
Results for Monetary Policy
We now describe the determinacy and stability results for the interest rate rules described in Section 2. ( (using our notation)
In particular, if policy obeys the "Taylor principle" that χ π > 1, so that nominal interest rates respond at least one for one with inflation, then determinacy and stability are guaranteed.
If lagged or forward looking Taylor rules are used the situation is more complicated. Full analytical results are not available, but (Bullard and Mitra 2002) investigate the issues numerically using a calibrated version of the model. Under (5) they find that for χ As outlined above, in (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) we focus on optimal monetary policy and obtain striking negative results for fundamentals based policy rules (9), (10). Under optimal discretionary policy, with i t rule (9), the system is invariably unstable under private agent learning (the system is also invariably indeterminate in this case). The basic intuition for this result is that, say, upward mistakes in E * t π t + 1 lead to higher π t , both directly and indirectly through lower ex ante real interest rates, which under learning sets off a cumulative movement away from REE. One might hope that the feedback from x t − 1 under (10), the fundamentals based i t rule with commitment, would stabilize the economy. However, we show that with this policy rule, as well, the economy is invariably unstable under learning. This is the case even though with this rule there are regions in which the optimal REE is determinate.
2
The instability of the fundamentals based rules, designed after all to obtain optimal policy, is deeply worrying and serves as a strong warning to policy makers not to automatically assume that rational expectations will be attained. It is necessary to examine explicitly the robustness of contemplated policy rules to private agent learning. In (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) and (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) we show how the problems of instability and indeterminacy can be overcome if private agents' expectations are observable, so that interest rate rules can be in part conditioned on these expectations. We now look for appropriate rules of the form (11), (12). We focus here on the case in which policy makers can operate under commitment.
The desired rule is obtained by combining the IS curve (1), the price setting equation (2) 
.
Under optimal discretionary policy (7) is used instead and the coefficients are identical except that δ L = 0. Under this expectations based optimal rule we obtain equally striking positive results. For all possible structural parameter values the system is determinate and the optimal REE is stable under private agent learning. The key to the stability results is the feedback from expectations to interest rates, so that deviations from rational expectations are offset by policy and in such a way that under learning private agents are guided over time to form expectations consistent with the optimal REE. Our expectations based rule obeys a form of the Taylor principle since δ π > 1. Note that our optimal policy rule conditions on both private expectations and observable exogenous shocks, as well as lagged output.
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We also remark that it is important for the central bank to use a correct structural model of boundedly-rational individual behavior when computing the optimal expectations based rule.
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Next we consider the approximate targeting rules of (McCallum and Nelson 2000) . In (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) we numerically investigate the rule (13) and find that it is also invariably determinate and stable under learning. Since it can be shown that for large θ > 0 the resulting REE will be close to the optimal REE, this also provides an attractive policy rule. As (McCallum and Nelson 2000) point out, a potential difficulty with this rule is that it requires contemporaneous observations of aggregate output and inflation when setting the interest rate. They therefore consider alternative versions of their approximate targeting rule and in particular recommend a forward looking version, which is discussed below. Finally, we remark that our discussion has been limited to formulations of monetary policy in terms of interest rate rules. Alternatively, policy could be formulated as a money supply rule, a prominent example of which is the Friedman proposal for k−percent money growth. (Evans and Honkapohja 2003b) show that Friedman's rule always delivers determinacy and E-stability in the standard New Keynesian model. However, it does not perform well in terms of the policy objective function. A more systematic study of the performance of money supply rules remains to be done.
Operationality
Many of the i t rules discussed above have the potential difficulty that they may not be operational, as discussed in (McCallum 1999) . For example, (McCallum and Nelson 2000) note that it may be unrealistic to assume that policy makers can condition policy on current x t and π t . Similarly, one could question whether accurate observations on private expectations are available. We consider these points in the reverse order.
Observability of Private Expectations
Our recommended expectations based rule requires observations of current private expectations of future variables. Survey data on private forecasts of future inflation and various measures of future output do exist but there are concerns about the accuracy of this data. If observations of expectations are subject to a white noise measurement error then our stability and determinacy results are unaffected. Furthermore, if measurement errors are small then the policy will be close to optimal. However, if measurement errors are large then this will lead to a substantial deterioration in performance. In this case one might consider substituting a proxy for such observations. Since we are assuming that agents forecast by running VARs, the most natural proxy is for the Central Bank to estimate corresponding VARs and use these in (12). Clearly, if this precisely describes agents forecasts then it is equivalent to observing these expectations. However, we can consider less extreme cases in which agents and the Central Bank begin with different initial estimates and/or use data sets with different initial dates.
For the case of optimal discretionary policy and forward based instrument rules this issue was analyzed in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2002) . We here show that using VAR proxies can also achieve convergence to the optimal REE with commitment. Before proceeding with this analysis we note that in the case in which private expectations are observed and incorporated into our expectations based rule (12), the reduced form is given by (14) with
and that (Evans and Honkapohja 2002a) show that this reduced form leads to stability and determinacy. When the private agents and the Central Bank are separately estimating and forecasting using VARs, we must distinguish between their expectations. An extended E-stability analysis can give the conditions for convergence of learning, as shown in (Honkapohja and Mitra 2001b ). In the current context this is done as follows. The equations (1)- (2) . Combining these equations leads to the reduced form 
It is easily verified that the implied ALM is of the form
with the associated map from the PLMs to the ALM
Because the P and CB parameters are mapped into the same ALM parameters, it can be shown that the E-stability conditions are identical to those that obtain if forecasts are identical in the model, i.e. in which the coefficient matrix on the expectations E * t y t + 1
. This is identical to the earlier reduced form under the interest rate rule (12). Hence we have stability here as well. 
Non-Observability of Current Data
As pointed out by (McCallum and Nelson 2000) , a difficulty with the approximate targeting rule (13) is that it presupposes that the policy maker can observe current output gap and inflation when setting the interest rate.
(McCallum and Nelson 2000) recommend use of forward looking versions of approximate targeting rules. In this case the policy maker adjusts the current interest rate in response to the discrepancy from the optimality condition (8) anticipated for the next period, i.e.
This requires specification of E C B t
(.) and we consider the case where both the Central Bank and private agents use forecasts based on identical estimated VARs, i.e. E C B t It turns out that determinacy and stability under learning are no longer guaranteed if the rule (24) is employed. Numerical results indicate that sufficiently large values of the policy parameter θ induce both instability under learning and indeterminacy. We focus here on the upper bound on θ required to avoid instability and compare the performance of (24) in terms of welfare loss against the welfare loss under optimal policy.
We consider the performance of the rule (24) . The latter paper uses a wide range of values for ρ and our choice is in the middle of this range. Seriously calibrating these parameters to the data would require their values to be contingent on both ϕ and λ as well the policy rule. Because we want to compare the performance of different policy rules for given structural parameters, we must in any case fix the underlying structure of the model and therefore we simply adopt the above values as a benchmark for numerical computations.
For the different calibrations the value of the welfare loss from the rule (24), with θ set optimally under the E-stability constraint 1 6
, and for the optimal REE are as follows: where "AT" and "EB" refer to approximate targeting and optimal expectations based rules, respectively. (Technical details for computing the welfare loss are given in Appendix 2.) These results show that there are sometimes substantial welfare losses from using the E-stable forward looking AT rule that can be avoided if the EB rule is feasible.
Expectation Shocks
In this section we introduce another type of observability problem in private expectations. It is assumed that, though private agents are learning as before, their actual expectations are affected by additional shocks of optimism or pessimism. We initially assume that the policy maker does not see these shocks and bases its interest rate policy only on the component of expectations that comes from learning behavior. For example, the Central Bank could be running its own version of least squares learning to generate the required forecasts. We consider both the expectations based rule (12) and the forward looking approximate targeting rule (24). We then contrast these results with those from the EB rule when private expectations are fully observable. We must derive the modifications to the reduced form. PLMs of private agents and the Central Bank take the familiar form ) is a shock to private expectations that is for simplicity assumed to be iid. The forecasts of the Central Bank are
where κ = 0 or 1, depending on whether the Central Bank is able to obtain precise information on the expectation shocks.
For the case of the expectations based rule (12) the modified reduced form is
For the approximate targeting rule (24) the reduced form (25) changes to
We note that E-stability and determinacy properties of the models are not affected by the expectation shocks. From the reduced forms (26) and (27) we next calculate welfare losses due to unobserved expectations shocks. We assume that the standard deviation of the expectation shocks in output gap and inflation are 0.1 and 0.05, respectively. The welfare losses for (12) and (24) Comparing these results to the preceding section it is seen that expectation shocks result in an increase in the losses under either rule. The computed losses suggest that the expectations based optimal rule seems to perform better than the forward looking approximate targeting rule. However, the comparison could go the other way if there are big shocks to inflation expectations. We now increase the standard deviation for inflation expectation shocks first to 0.1 and then to 0.2. In these cases the welfare losses are Finally, we note that if the Central Bank has accurate information on the expectation shocks then the welfare loss from the expectations based rule (12) is dramatically improved. We illustrate this for the last case in which the standard deviation of the output expectation shock is 0.1 and the standard deviation of the inflation expectation shock is 0.2. Formally, setting κ = 1 we obtain These welfare losses remain somewhat higher than the minimum losses without the expectation shocks, which were, respectively, 0.755, 0.296 and 0.296 for the three calibrations. Though the rule with κ = 1 can neutralize fully the shocks to output gap expectations (see (26)), this is not the case for the shocks to inflation expectations. These results nonetheless illustrate the value of policy being able to condition on accurate observations of private expectations.
Estimation of Structural Parameters
Implementation of our expectations based optimal rule, as well as the approximate targeting rule, requires knowledge of structural parameters. A question of considerable interest is whether policy makers can obtain consistent estimates of λ and ϕ if private agents are learning. We take up this issue in the context of the expectations based rule. In (Evans and Honkapohja 2003a) we showed that consistent estimation of the structural parameters was possible in the case of optimal discretionary policy. Here we show how to carry out this procedure in the context of policy with commitment and we do so in a setting that requires instrumental variable estimation. First, we extend the model to allow for unobserved shocks. The IS and Phillips curves now take the form 
The Central Bank is assumed to conduct monetary policy using the optimal expectations based rule (12) with estimated values for the structural parameters, i.e. The key result is that the economy converges to the optimal REE when the Central Bank uses the optimal expectations based rule (34) and both private agents and policy maker learn using the specified algorithms. We remark that convergence to equilibrium is local in the sense that the initial parameter estimates can be chosen freely only within a neighborhood of the RE parameter values. Appendix 3 outlines the proof of this result.
As noted above, this result is robust to the assumption that agents use contemporaneous values of endogenous variables in the forecasts. In this case the equation (30) also must be estimated using recursive instrumental variables. Again x t − 1 can be used as the instrument.
Conclusions
The design of monetary policy needs to take into account the possibility that the economy may not always be in a full intertemporal, i.e. rational expectations, equilibrium. If economic agents update their forecasting procedures, the resulting process of learning may or may not lead the economy towards an REE. Convergence or non-convergence of the learning process depends critically on the policy rule followed by the Central Bank. We have reviewed recent research demonstrating that stability under learning is a serious concern. In particular, some recently proposed policy rules that depend solely on fundamentals are not conducive to convergence to equilibrium. We recommend instead expectations based optimal rules, i.e. interest rate rules depending appropriately on private expectations as well as fundamentals, which have been shown to lead to both stability under learning and determinacy of equilibria. We have also noted that, if non-optimal instrument rules are used instead, stability under learning imposes additional constraints on monetary policy rules, and policy design should take account of these constraints.
Implementation of interest rate rules raises several practical concerns. First, questions of observability can arise. These problems can relate to availability of current data and to forecasts of private agents. We have discussed ways for dealing with these concerns. Second, the economy may in practice be subject to expectation shocks, in addition to transitory shocks associated with learning. These will not usually alter the conditions for stability under learning, but if the shocks are sufficiently large the ranking of different policy rules can be affected. However, if private expectations are fully observable, this provides an additional motivation for following our recommended expectations based optimal rule.
Finally, implementation of expectations based or approximate targeting policy rules requires knowledge of key structural parameters. If the Central Bank does not have this knowledge, the problem can be overcome by appropriately estimating these parameters and using the estimated parameters in the interest rate rule. In particular, we have shown that this procedure is viable for the expectations based rule, which is locally stable under simultaneous learning by private agents and policy makers.
We hope that these rules provide useful guidelines for the design of monetary policy. However, we recognize that much further research on these issues remains to be done. 
Appendix 2: Welfare Calculation
We calculate the expected welfare loss of the stationary REE, which is 1/(1 − β) times E(αx 
The variance of output gap and inflation can be read off from (37).
i.e. G(.) reduces to T (ξ) − ξ when the estimatesφ,λ I V take their true values. Here T (ξ) = T (a, b, c) is the mapping from the PLM to the ALM given by (19) with matrix coefficients (22).
The associated differential equations for the algorithms (32) and (33) in the differential equations are functions of τ , which is a virtual time concept.
To study convergence under real time learning, one considers local asymptotic stability of the entire differential equation system at the REE ϑ * . To analyze stability of the system we first note that differential equations for all of the second moments are stable. It then follows thatφ → ϕ and λ I V → λ. Using (38) it follows that stability of the system reduces to the earlier E-stability differential equation (20) for the model with commitment. Thus we have the local stability results that the policy maker learns the structural parameters, private agents learn RE and the economy converges the optimal REE. 
